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I. EXCUSES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This conference puts on the table two linked questions: Can Hosanna-
Tabor1 be reconciled with Employment Division v. Smith2 and, if so, on
what basis?  Let me say straightway that I have at most an amateur’s
understanding of constitutional law and jurisprudence.  I bring to our
questions some intuitions about the best framework for thinking about
them, and whatever light my home discipline of political theory can shed 
*  © 2016 William A. Galston.  The Brookings Institution.
1. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
2. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2012)). 
 147




.  I have also benefitted enor
article on the topic of this conference.

















      
 
    
 
    
     
   
    
    
   
     
II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S ORIGINAL INTENT
At the beginning of his majority opinion in Employment Division v. 
Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia sketched what he regarded as settled First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Among them: “The government may not . . .
lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma.”4  In support of this proposition, he cites the classic 
institution autonomy cases: Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,5 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral,6 and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.7  The
obvious inference is that he saw no contradiction between this line of 
Supreme Court decisions and the argument he proceeds to make in Smith. 
An exchange during the Hosanna-Tabor oral argument confirms this 
inference. As Douglas Laycock tells the story:
Responding somewhat incredulously to the government’s theory that whatever
rights the church might have derive only from freedom of association, [Justice
Scalia] said that “there, black on white in the text of the Constitution are special
protections for religion.”  A little later, he was even more explicit: “Smith didn’t 
involve employment by a church.  It had nothing to do with who the church could
employ. . . . I don’t see how that has any relevance to this.”8 
As the only member of the Court to participate in both decisions, Justice 
Scalia’s words have special resonance. But as he would be the first to insist, 
intention—even authorial intention—does not settle the matter.  The question 
is whether the text and argument of the two cases form a tolerably coherent 
whole. 
3. Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
1 (2011).
4. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (citations omitted).  Disputes over authority involve the 
rightful occupants and powers of religious offices; over dogma, the truth or authenticity of
doctrinal claims. 
5. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
6. Kedroff v. Saint Nichols Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94
(1952).
7. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
8. Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 839, 855 (2012) (footnote omitted) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument
at 29, 37, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012) (No. 1-553)). 
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I have long argued that Smith was wrongly decided, and I have often
wondered how Justice Scalia would respond to the hypothetical that I have 
posed: Suppose the Volstead Act, which implemented the Prohibition 
amendment, had not contained an exemption for sacramental wine.9  Would 
enforcing that act against core rituals of Catholics and Jews have been
consistent with the Free Exercise Clause?  I think not—indeed, obviously
not. But the logic of Smith says otherwise. 
III. A FLAWED POINT OF DEPARTURE
However flawed, Smith remains good law today, and for purposes of 
this paper I will treat it as such. I believe that Smith and Hosanna-Tabor
can coexist, logically as well as peacefully—if the kind of cases to which 
each applies is carefully delimited.  There is general agreement that this
demarcation is inadequately specified, let alone theorized, in Chief Justice
John Roberts’s majority opinion. 10  The passage in which he distinguishes 
Hosanna-Tabor from Smith reads, in its entirety: “[A] church’s selection
of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote. Smith involved 
government regulation of only outward physical acts.  The present case,
in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”11 
This distinction is at best incomplete.  One sentence refers to “outward
physical acts,” presumably as counterposed to inner beliefs.12  But the
venerable belief or act distinction gets us nowhere in the case before us,
which pivots on the status of an act—the church’s decision to fire a 
minister. The following sentence draws another line, between an internal
church decision and what transpires outside its institutional boundary. But 
presumably the Court does not want to say that all such internal decisions 
are immunized against legal scrutiny; there are too many instances in
 9. See National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305, 308–09 (1919), 
repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, § 1, Pub. L. No. 74-347,
49 Stat. 872 (1935). 
10. See e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 992– 
94 (2013) (explaining that the Supreme Court “distinguished Smith from the ministerial
exception” using a “strange argument” and a “distinction that cannot hold water”); Michael W.
McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 834–35
(2012) (“The Court’s analysis raises many questions. . . . This is a commendable example 
of judicial minimalism; . . . .  But it does create uncertainty.”)
11. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
12. Id.
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which settled law says that they are not.  So the Court gestures toward a 
third line, between church decisions that affect its “faith and mission” and 
those that do not.  But that cannot be right either, because in practice, drawing 
that line would inevitably entangle courts in the kinds of theological inquiries 
that they have repeatedly declared their incompetence to conduct and 
determination to avoid. 
An example will illustrate the difficulty.  It is often taken for granted
that there are categories of cases, such as slip and falls in church parking 
lots, for which church beliefs and practices are irrelevant.  But consider a
facially innocuous municipal ordinance that requires all property owners 
to clear the sidewalks fronting their properties within six hours after a 
winter storm ends.  If a snowfall begins on Friday night, by Saturday morning
the sidewalk leading to the doors of an Orthodox Jewish synagogue will 
be treacherous.  But Jewish law forbids every Jew from working on Shabbat, 
and shoveling snow fits squarely into that prohibition, so no congregant 
can do the job. Jewish law also prohibits carrying or conveying money
on Shabbat, so the congregants cannot pay a non-Jew to clear the sidewalk.
Unless some passer-by learns of the congregation’s plight and shovels out
of the goodness of his heart, the congregants will have no choice but to 
violate the ordinance. And if someone slips and falls on the sidewalk in 
front of their synagogue, they will be liable—despite the fact that complying 
with the ordinance would have forced them to violate the scrupulous 
observance of Shabbat, one of the defining requirements of traditional
Judaism.
My little story has two morals.  First, we cannot look at an act or a category 
of acts in isolation to determine whether it affects per se a religious
organization’s “faith and mission,” a thoroughly Christian phrase, by the 
way, that would have no natural place in many other traditions.  To state 
the obvious, different faiths imbue different acts with spiritual significance, 
and many of the boundaries thus drawn will go against the grain of civil
law.
Second, the bare fact that a civil law burdens the practices of some 
religious faiths does not by itself settle the question of whether that law is
consistent with the free exercise of religion.  Pushed to the hilt, free 
exercise claims can go too far, unduly restricting the ability of civil authorities 
to pursue justice and the common good.  Conversely, when the claims of 
civil law are pushed too far—especially in the name of justice for
individuals—they end up trampling legitimate free exercise claims.  In the 
end, we must be able to say “Thus far and no farther” and to give reasons
for our judgment that most people will find compelling—or at least
reasonable. We must try to go farther than Chief Justice Roberts did. 
150
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IV. REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN MORALITY AND LAW
Let me suggest a point of departure.  In A Theory of Justice and subsequently,
the late John Rawls proposed a method—“reflective equilibrium”—for 
arriving at stable moral judgments.13  A key element of this method is
what he called “provisional fixed points”—considered judgments about
particulars in which we have great confidence that racial discrimination is 
wrong, for example and with which any general account must be consistent.14 
Rawls advanced this account in the context of moral philosophy, but it 
may be extended to other areas.  There may be—and I shall suggest that 
there are—such fixed points within our constitutional order and traditions.
Of course, they will not necessarily have any force outside this context; 
they will regulate a narrower range than do moral fixed points, which are 
meant to apply in a wide range of institutional and historical contexts.  But
no matter, because all we are looking for is a general justification of the 
ministerial exception that works for us. Whether it applies more broadly is 
another matter altogether. 
This strategy risks boring readers with a series of innocuous banalities.  
I will take that risk in the hope that propositions we take for granted can
shape our understanding of less obvious matters.




My point of departure is a judgment almost universally shared, at least
in the United States: Government should not be in the business of selecting
officials of religious organizations, or of limiting the ability of such
organizations to choose the leaders they want.  This means that churches
should not seek from government, and government should not render, any
judgment about the fitness of individuals for religious offices.15  Nor do 
laws banning what would be considered discriminatory in the civil realm 
apply with equal force to religious groups. Catholics exclude women from 
13. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 46–53 (1971). 
14. Id. at 19–20. 
15. Then-Secretary of State James Madison’s refusal to advise Bishop Carroll about 
the selection of the official to oversee the Catholic affairs of the newly acquired Louisiana 
Purchase set the standard of American principle and practice.  Chief Justice Roberts aptly 
cites this example in his Hosanna-Tabor decision.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703 
(citing Letter from James Madison to Bishop Carroll (Nov. 20, 1806), in 20 RECORDS OF
THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA 63 (1909)). 
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the priesthood, as do Orthodox Jews from their rabbinate.16  As far as I 
can tell, no one thinks that the writ of civil law extends to these practices.
I assume that the same limitation would apply to membership.  Men or 
women-only religions probably would not fare well over time, but it is no 
business of the state to prohibit them. 
In this respect, among others, there is a difference between religious groups 
and many other kinds of associations.  It is settled law that sex discrimination 
statutes apply to organizations such as the Rotary Club and Jaycees.17 
Some others—“expressive associations”—enjoy a greater measure of 
protection, on a case by case basis, although the lead case—concerning the 
Boy Scouts—remains highly controversial.18  By contrast, religious groups 
enjoy a categorical per se immunity from sex discrimination laws and
regulations, at least when it comes to the selection of their spiritual 
leaders.19 
This is not to say that the selection of religious leaders is entirely outside 
the writ of civil law. To see why, imagine a religion that uses the “Is God 
with him?” test to determine its leader.  To qualify, a candidate must put
one bullet in a revolver, place the gun to his head, and pull the trigger.  If
he does and survives, he has proved his faith, and God has shown His 
favor.20  If this seems preposterous, recall the test that Abraham had to 
pass to demonstrate his faith and assure his position as Judaism’s lead
patriarch.21  Or—to get closer to home—consider a fundamentalist Mormon
group that requires its leaders not only to preach plural marriage but also
to practice it.  The principle in all such cases is the same: if the state has
the right to prohibit an act, then it has the right to prevent the selection of 
religious leaders through methods that employ or require that act.  The 
fact that the First Church of La Cosa Nostra requires aspirants for religious 
office to be “made men” does not mean that the state should defer to this
practice.
So what is the difference between laws against murder, which the state
may enforce against the selection of religious leaders, and laws against
discrimination on the basis of gender, which it may not?  And even more 
pointedly, why may the state enforce prohibitions on polygamy but not 
16. See, e.g., Maureen Fiedler, Introduction to BREAKING THROUGH THE STAINED
GLASS CEILING: WOMEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN THEIR OWN WORDS, at xvii (Maureen
Fielder ed., 2010). 
17. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 
(1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628–29 (1984). 
18. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655–56 (2000). 
19. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 714. 
20. Another selection process resting on the same principle would be an armed duel 
between two finalists for religious office. 
21. See Genesis 22:1–18. 
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prohibitions on gender discrimination?  I do not believe that legal concepts 
and categories alone will allow us to answer such questions.  Rather, we 
will have to argue that freedom of religion can be practiced only within 
the framework of an ordered civil society—and that the preservation of 
such an order requires certain basic institutions and practices.  Jews call
these civil requisites the Noachide law, which is binding on all,22 as
distinct from Halacha, which is binding only on Jews.23  Much later, H. 
L. A. Hart dubbed this the “minimum content of natural law”—not the 
totality required for a good life in a good society, but the basic requisites 
of a society that is tolerably ordered and decent.24 
My suggestion is that intuitions of this sort lie behind the apparently
contradictory judgments to which we—and American jurisprudence—are 
drawn. And because they are substantive and comparative—X is more 
fundamental than Y—they will always be contested.  That does not mean
that such judgments are wrong, or that the courts are wrong to make them. 
Indeed, they have no choice. 
Another provisional fixed point: civil law may rightly prohibit certain 
religious practices, whatever their theological justification and importance
within particular religions. A neo-Aztec group may sincerely believe that
without annual virgin sacrifices, grave harm will ensue.  Nonetheless,
government may intervene to prevent and punish this practice.  Another 
group may believe that regular sex between adults and minors is the road 
to salvation.  Without rendering theological judgment, government may
simply prohibit this practice, et cetera.
Embedded in this point is a widely accepted principle: beliefs are one
thing, acts another.  Government can forbid polygamy, but it cannot forbid 
churches from preaching the superiority of plural marriage.25  In this  
respect, regardless of other differences, religious believers and institutions 
are on all fours with everyone else. 
22. See DAVID NOVAK, NATURAL LAW IN JUDAISM 149 (1998) (“The Noachide laws 
or ‘the seven commandments of the children of Noah’ . . . are those norms the Rabbis 
considered to be binding on all humankind, who, following scriptural narrative, are the 
descendants of Noah.”).
23. See id. at 63 (“If ‘ethics’ be defined prima facie as a system of rules governing 
interhuman relations, then ‘Jewish’ ethics is identical with Jewish law.  It is Halakhah.”).
24. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193–94 (3d ed. 2012).
25. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990), superseded by statute, 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2012)). 
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Bringing together these two points, we reach a third: civil law applies 
with full unmodified force to some activities of religious organizations but 
not others.  Regardless of theological doctrine, for example, religious officials
who sexually abuse children are subject to criminal prosecution, and 
likewise for murder and other acts that the law rightly makes criminal. 
Less clear is whether religious officials who become aware of such 
crimes are subject to a legal obligation to report them.  Every state has a
statute identifying persons who are required to report suspected child 
abuse and neglect to the appropriate authorities.  Some states identify
categories of professionals who are required to do so, but eighteen states 
mandate reporting for any person who suspects that such a crime has
occurred. Some states designate confessional communications between 
clergy and members of their church as privileged, but many do not, and
seven states explicitly disavow the clergy-penitent privilege as grounds 
for failing to report suspected child abuse or neglect.26 
North Carolina provides a good example of how this issue plays out.  A 
state statute requires “[a]ny person or institution” that suspects child abuse 
or neglect to report to the local department of social services.27  Another
provision of the law states that “No privilege shall be grounds for any
person[s] . . . failing to report,” even when the knowledge of suspicion is
acquired in an “official professional capacity.”28  There is only one exception, 
for knowledge gained by “an attorney from that attorney’s client during 
representation.”29 
A detailed analysis of North Carolina’s child abuse and neglect system
comments that “confidential communications between a person and his or
her rabbi, minister, priest, or other religious confidant might be viewed as 
part of that individual’s exercise of his or her protected religious freedom.”30 
Indeed it might, and the same could be said of the religious confidant.
So what would happen if a Catholic priest ordered to testify about what
he was told in the confessional refused to do so, invoking the Free Exercise
Clause as a defense?  No doubt his brief in the ensuing case would quote the
Code of Canon Law, Canon 983: “The sacramental seal is inviolable;
therefore, it is absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a 
26. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1–3 (2014), https://www.childwelfare. 
gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q27-D2MJ].
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-301 (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation). 
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-310 (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation). 
29. Id.
 30. JANET MASON, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN NORTH CAROLINA 62
(3d ed. 2013). 
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penitent in words or in any manner and for any reason.”31  A priest who 
complied with a court order to testify rather than being held in contempt 
of court and jailed would break his oath to the Church and risk 
excommunication, not to mention his eternal salvation.
It is reasonably clear how the Smith framework would resolve this issue: 
the North Carolina law deals in a neutral way with conduct that the state 
is free to regulate; end of story.  Indeed, that law might have passed muster
in the pre-Smith era: the state is pursuing what is incontestably a compelling 
interest (the well-being of children) through means that, though harsh as 
applied to the priest, could well be the narrowest that would effectively 
promote that interest. 
It is less clear how this issue would fare under Hosanna-Tabor. One 
may wonder whether the proposed distinction between outward acts and
matters internal to the church really works: substitute the sacrament of 
wine for the ingestion of peyote and ask again whether exception-less
Prohibition would concern only “outward physical acts.”  But granting the
distinction arguendo, the seal of the confessional would seem to fall 
squarely on the other side of the line. Surely it affects the “faith and mission 
of the church itself.”  On the other hand, the state’s interest in enforcing 
reporting requirements is hardly trivial. 
Hosanna-Tabor tries to replace both balancing tests and the over-broad 
principle of Smith with a categorical dyad between inner and outer:  if a 
matter is internal, it is outside the state’s purview.  But this distinction is
too simple.  As Christopher Lund observes: 
[A]ny account of church autonomy must acknowledge situations where religious
freedom will have to be subordinated to other values. . . .  Every constitutional
right is exercised within bounds, and any theory that hopes to have some practical 
reality must take practical reality into account.  Church autonomy is church 
autonomy within limits, and no more.32 
If Lund is right—and I think he is—then some version of the “compelling 
state interest” test reenters through the back door, and the Hosanna-Tabor 
court owes us an account of how this test would function within the
framework it creates. Because Hosanna-Tabor creates a strong presumption 
in favor of insulating internal church matters from public power, it would 
31. CODE OF CANON LAW: LATIN-ENGLISH EDITION 361 (Canon Law Soc’y of Am. 
ed., 1983) (translating 1983 CODE c.983, § 1). 
 32. Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of
Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1206–07 (2014). 
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take a really strong public interest to override it.  To take an extreme case:
suppose a serial murderer privately confesses to his crimes and tells his 
confessor that an irresistible impulse will compel him to continue until he
is stopped.  Should the fact that he tells this to a priest rather than a friend 
or family member make a difference in the eyes of the law?
A fourth provisional point: government should not be in the business of
assessing the truth of religious doctrines, or of judging their fidelity to 
some preexisting doctrinal orthodoxy.  As Lund points out, English law 
often called on courts to decide which of two competing factions competing 
for control of church property “came closest to the original beliefs of the
church.”33  In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull,34 the
Supreme Court unanimously set this practice aside as incompatible with 
the Constitution.  “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized,” the 
Court declared, “when church property litigation is made to turn on the 
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and 
practice.”35 
As far as I know, there has been no serious effort to revisit this decision 
in the nearly half century since it was handed down.  On the contrary: the
intuitive heart of the decision—an aversion to the state becoming
entangled with the church—swiftly became a pillar of First Amendment
jurisprudence in cases such as Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New 
York36 and Lemon v. Kurtzman.37  We now take it for granted that assessing 
the truth or fidelity of specific church doctrines is beyond both the
competence and the jurisdiction of civil government.  I find it hard to imagine 
the federal courts returning to anything resembling the once-standard English
approach. 
An apparently unrelated issue turns out to rest on the same considerations.  
As Lund observes, “Every court in this country will let you sue your 
doctor and lawyer for malpractice, yet none of them will let you sue your 
rabbi or priest.”38  Why not?  What is the difference? The obvious answer
is that in the cases of medicine and law, we have confidence that widely
accepted civic norms enable us to develop standards applicable to all.  It 
does not matter what your faith is, or indeed whether you have one: a 
doctor is a doctor, and the same basic standards of good practice apply to
you and every other doctor.  It is much harder to say the same for persons 
33. Id. at 1198. 
34. Presbytarian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbytarian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
35. Id. at 449. 
36.  Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
37.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
38. Lund, supra note 32, at 1208. 
156
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of religious authority.  Priests are bound by certain norms of practice that 
are internal to Catholicism, rabbis to Judaism, and so forth.  A priest cannot
counsel a pregnant teen girl to get an early-term abortion; a rabbi can.  Is 
one of them good practice, the other malpractice?  Which is which?  Equally
implausible is the idea that civil authorities should or can hold religious 
authorities to the standards of their own faiths.  Are courts to be in the business 
of determining whether a priest’s practices conform to the teachings of the
seminary and the norms of the Church?  If anything is the internal business 
of a religious institution, this is it. 
A fifth provisional point: from the standpoint of civil law, churches are
voluntary associations.  This is so despite the fact that many religions do 
not so view themselves from a doctrinal point of view.  For Orthodox
Jews, the children of Jewish mothers are Jews by birth; traditional Muslims 
do not accept the right of believers to repudiate their faith; Catholics 
practice infant baptism.  But our civil law does not criminalize apostasy, 
or even recognize it as a legal category.  Nor does it permit religious
organizations to retain individual members against their will. 
Although political theorists debate the scope of “exit rights,” they agree 
that the state must define and defend them.  Voluntary associations cannot 
be prisons, and exit from membership cannot be made unduly burdensome. 
At some point, religious indoctrination turns into brainwashing; at some
point, the surrender of personal resources to the religious community 
makes exit too difficult. 
Churches are two-way voluntary organizations.  Individuals cannot be
drafted into them; as adults, anyway, they may choose for themselves
whether to join. At the same time, churches may decide whether to grant 
or deny membership to applicants, on whatever grounds they see fit.  If
anything is internal to the faith and mission of the church, surely it is the 
requirements for membership, including the rules governing conversion.
As far as I know, the U.S. government has never been in the business 
of ordering religious associations to accept individual members, or categories 
of members, against such associations’ will.  Nonetheless, for more than
thirty years it has been settled law that government may substantially
burden membership practices that it cannot forbid outright.  The seven-
member majority in Bob Jones (eight-member with Justice Powell’s 
concurrence) held that the federal government could interpret the statute 
governing tax-exempt organizations to exclude exemptions for religious 
schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies: “Government 
has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination
 157


















   


















in education . . . [which] substantially outweighs whatever burden denial 
of tax benefits places on [the university leaders’] exercise of their religious
beliefs.”39 
Having affirmed the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor, could the
Court go on to revoke the school’s tax exemption as contrary to public 
policy?  Almost certainly not.  The reason is that history has long guided
the Court’s jurisprudence in this area.40 Not only is race special, but also 
schools that propagate racist views to impressionable young minds occupy 
the bulls-eye of strict scrutiny.  Laws prohibiting other categories of 
discrimination are important, but not as compelling as race.
In footnote twenty-one, the Bob Jones Court clarifies it’s understanding
of what makes race special.  Schools that discriminate on the basis of race 
“cannot be deemed to confer a benefit on the public.”41  Their racial policies
pervade and pollute the totality of their public impact.  That may not be 
true, says the Court, for other categories.  Therefore, they need not decide,
and are not deciding, whether “an organization providing a public benefit 
and otherwise meeting the requirements of § 501c(3) could nevertheless 
be denied tax-exempt status if certain of its activities violated a law or
public policy.”42 The door remains open for future courts to decide whether 
violations of law or policy concerning gender, sexual orientation, or disability
status are on all fours with race.
Another provisional point: voluntarily joining a religious association 
always means accepting some internal rules of governance and discipline, 
and the state will be very reluctant to override them. As the Court said
long ago in Watson v. Jones43: 
All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to [its]
government, and are bound to submit to it.  But it would be a vain consent and
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved
by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them 
reversed.44 
This principle would seem to apply with special force when the terms of 
membership explicitly forbid taking church decisions to external authorities
for adjudication. To accept those terms, then, is to forfeit claims, even 
rights, to which consenting individuals would otherwise be entitled. 
39.  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). 
40. See id. at 588 (“Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought beneficial to the 
social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular community, are deeply rooted in
our history, as in that of England.”). 
41. Id. at 596 n.21. 
42. Id.
43.  Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). 
44. Id. at 729. 
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I can see no reason why this logic of consent would not apply to church 
decisions promoting individuals to and removing them from positions of 
authority and responsibility.  Catholic dissidents have every right to use 
whatever forums the Church provides to urge the ordination of women.
But as Catholics, they have surrendered the right to promote their cause 
by appealing outside the church to secular laws against sex discrimination. 
Similarly, a church that required certain standards of physical health and 
function as conditions for holding religious office would be immune to
challenges based on the Americans with Disabilities Act.45 
Still, everything has limits, including consent. Individuals cannot surrender 
their right to be treated in ways that comport with basic enforceable societal 
norms.  A neo-Aztec cult could not sacrifice virgins, even if the virgins
were consenting adults. Parents could not consent to the sexual abuse of 
their minor children, even if they sincerely believed that their religion’s 
theology required it. A church whose mandatory rituals include sex with 
minors receives no constitutional protection.  Members of the clergy who
commit such crimes are liable to prosecution, and doctrine is no defense.
A fortiori, it is no defense for church members.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is time to pull together these disjecta membra. 
In recent years there has been much discussion about narrow versus 
broad conceptions of religious free exercise.  Narrow conceptions focus on 
religious doctrines, rituals, leaders, and members; broad conceptions add
religion’s role in the public square.  This distinction manifests itself in
politics. To oversimplify: liberals are comfortable with the narrow conception 
but worry that the broad conception will be used to justify the imposition 
of religious norms on society as a whole, while conservatives fear that 
confining religion to the narrow conception will create a “naked” public 
square that allows secular values to dominate by default. 
The ministerial exception falls squarely within the narrow conception. 
That it has proved controversial—though not, as it turns out, within the 
Court—exemplifies a misguided line of argument that political theorist
Nancy Rosenblum calls the “logic of congruence.”46  This argument’s default
assumption is that public laws and norms ought to be binding on associations 
45.  42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2012). 
46. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Democratic Families: “The Logic of Congruence” 
and Political Identity, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 145, 151 (2003). 
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and even families. To carve out zones of immunity is to unleash the dogs 
of injustice. There must be an external authority to which aggrieved
associations and family members can appeal.
With its deep roots in our history of racial subordination and family 
violence, this argument is viscerally powerful and valid—within limits.
The problem is that like a swollen river, it has overflowed its banks and 
threatens vast stretches of surrounding territory.  The template of racial and 
gender equality has been deployed repeatedly to generate new categories 
of claims for public redress, whatever the venue of the purported violation.
At the end of this road lie truncated conceptions of free association and
free exercise.
The ministerial exception is one part of a “thus far and no farther”
counter-thrust.  It reflects, at base, the conviction that religious groups 
should be able to choose their own leaders without external interference. 
In the process, these groups may employ criteria and procedures that
would be inadmissible in the public and private sectors.  Catholics and 
Orthodox Jews may exclude women from certain positions of leadership, 
and civil law cannot order them to change.  In this respect, among others, 
religions have the right to be different. 
Fortifying this conviction is the fact that religious groups are a species 
of voluntary association.  As such, its members agree to be governed by
certain norms and practices binding within only the group and on individuals 
only as long as they choose to be bound.  Included among these norms and 
practices may be the agreement not to seek redress for grievances outside
the authority of the association. 
There is nothing strange about such an agreement.  Many employment 
contracts include confidentiality requirements and promises not to compete 
with the employer for a certain period after the termination of the relation. 
In a wide range of circumstances, we may voluntarily surrender claims
that we could otherwise bring. Not all rights are inalienable; indeed, most 
are not. 
The third leg of the stool is a proposition central to liberal democracy 
as we have come to understand it: government lacks the capacity to settle 
disputes that rest wholly or in part on doctrinal differences, and it should 
not be in the business of doing so.  That is why U.S. courts have abandoned 
the effort to resolve claims that assert “fidelity to doctrine” as the justification 
for owning property or occupying offices of religious authority; that is 
why the anti-entanglement norm has proved a sturdy growth in contemporary
First Amendment jurisprudence; that is why, setting the standard for all 
future U.S. public officials, James Madison declined to be drawn into 
deliberations about the selection of church authorities.
None of this proves that the ministerial exception is without limit or 
exception. Indeed, I have come to wonder whether any legal or moral 
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conception is truly exceptionless.  My argument does suggest, however,
that the ministerial exception is a powerful presumption, rebuttable only
by weighty civil considerations.  A religion’s selection procedures may
require acts that the civil authorities may rightly forbid, wherever they
may occur.  I suspect that such instances will be rare. 
It is one thing to say that the selection of ministers is immune to laws 
governing hiring decisions in the public and private sectors, quite another 
that ministers are exempt from laws applying to officials in other 
circumstances.  This distinction features centrally in recent child abuse
scandals. So we cannot move directly from the ministerial exception to a 
full-blown theory of religious institutional autonomy, any more than we 
can move directly from the privacy of the confessional (whatever its limits
may be) to a comprehensive church exemption from ordinary requirements 
to report child abuse and other crimes as they become known to church 
officials. 
I conclude with a profession of philosophical faith.  As a Berlinian 
pluralist, I believe that the goods we rightly cherish rarely come packaged
together.  Almost always, we are compelled to choose between or among
goods, and these are the hardest choices.  Nearly every choice entails the 
real loss of some good, the lack of which will make the lives of some
others worse than they could have been.
This is certainly the case for the ministerial exception.  On my reading 
of the facts, Cheryl Perich would have had a good case if she had been 
able to bring the substance of her suit before a civil court.  Because the
Americans with Disabilities Act represents our collective judgment about 
fair treatment for individuals, there is a prima facie case that the ministerial
exception protected an instance of genuine unfairness from legal scrutiny
and redress.  The ministerial exception, then, represents a second collective
judgment: the goods the exception protects are weightier than the harms 
it allows. It is understandable that the most affected individuals and their 
most ardent supporters will dissent from this judgment. 
This is part of a larger tension that suffuses our public life—as political
theorist Jacob Levy puts it, “between the institutional realization of freedom
to associate and of freedom within (or from) group life.”47  And, he adds
wisely, “the ability to see freedom in our associational lives and power in
the state all too often limits the ability to see power in associations and the
possibility of freedom being enhanced by outside intervention—and vice 
47. JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM 295 (2015). 
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versa.”48  We must, he concludes, reject the impulse to synthesize these 
tensions into a larger harmonious theoretical whole. This means “living with
a degree of disharmony in our social lives . . . and our political theory.”49 
Despite my defense of the ministerial exception, I find myself compelled 
to accept Levy’s conclusion.  That means that the goods we have chosen
to leave behind will continue to make a claim that we experience as a 
troubling moral dissonance. 
48. Id.
 49. Id.
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